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Abstract
In this paper, we document the determinants of portfolio investments to Gulf Cooper-
ation Council (GCC) economies by bringing up the role played by market forces, cultural
affinities, and institutional quality. We classify the GCC economies as host to 35 countries
as per the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS) of the IMF for the period 2001-
2006. Using the CPIS data and data from various other reliable sources and appropriate
panel data analysis techniques, we find a number of interesting results: 1) the relatively
higher quality of institutional set up in GCC in comparison to other countries; 2) the rel-
ative volume of expatriates across source countries in GCC soil; and 3) bilateral factors
such as trade linkages between GCC and source countries, all statistically and significantly
explain portfolio investments to the GCC region. Additionally, we uncover the existence of
a portfolio “GCC bias”. That is, GCC investors exhibit a strong preference towards their
own markets when allocating their cross border financial asset holdings.
JEL classification: E44, F15, F36, F41
Keywords: International Portfolio Allocation, GCC, Bilateral Linkage, Institutional Qual-
ity, Expatriates.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to shed lights on the determinants of portfolio investments to Gulf
Cooperation Council(hereafter GCC) countries by investigating the role played by market forces,
labor in-migration, cultural affinities, and institutional quality. The GCC is an interesting case
begging for in-depth understanding of capital inflows for many reasons. Following the oil crisis of
the 1970s and early 1980s, the GCC had seen the largest increase in oil and gas export revenues.
Although part of this money was invested at home to build infrastructure and develop the
agricultural sector, a large portion was also allocated to finance investment in the United States
and Europe and heavy weaponry. These investments took place to respond to two urgencies
at the time: the need for protection against political instability and conflicts in the region and
the need to reduce reliance on oil revenues. During the 1970s and the 1980s when war was
raging in the Middle-East, it was inconceivable for the rather risk-averse investors to allocate
their portfolio in the region since the people who live there and the governments themselves
were expatriating capital in the hope of not losing it all at once in a conflict. Moreover, in
most of these countries, the law did not permit foreigners to own properties and have their own
businesses without a local sponsor.
Although massive investments of GCC oil revenues in US and European markets have so-
lidified political relationships with the West and have provided the much needed protection to
keep the political landscape intact, domestic macroeconomic structural reforms did not deliver
the good as anticipated. It did not take long for these countries(mostly Saudi Arabia) to realize
that supports to the agricultural sector for example out of oil revenues were not the best usage
of financial resources when oil prices tumbled in 1983 and thereafter(Hourani 2004). However,
a series of unfortunate events that took place in the 1990s and 2000s has brought to the GCC
the opportunity to correct the mistakes of the past as oil and gas prices were climbing again
to reach record levels in 2000 and thereafter. Also, these events have changed the patterns
of portfolio investments to GCC countries. With the September-11 attack on US soil, many
individuals of Arab descent who had investments in the US and other western countries were
looking for a safe haven as fear was mounting that these countries might freeze their capital
alleging that they have ties to terrorist organizations. No other countries in the Middle-East
and Africa represented a better alternative than the GCC region. The invasion of Iraq in 2003
and the rise of extremism giving rise to a halt in the production of oil in Iraq and a reduction
in the world supply of crude oil and natural gas have also benefited the GCC as the price of oil
had reached levels never seen before.
With the new windfall of oil and gas revenues, the GCC has this time adopted a different
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strategy by investing in industries in which they can build a competitive advantage. These
include petrochemical, banking and financial services, airline, tourism, real estate, telecommu-
nications, steel, and transportation, to cite just a few (Fasano and Iqbal 2003). In terms of
portfolio investment allocation, a wider range of countries in the Middle-East, North Africa,
and Asia have received their fair share while the US and Europe continue, due to political
reasons, to receive the largest portion(Molavi 2007 and World Bank 2005). What this new
strategy seems to have created is a reciprocal and trustworthy partnership that also attracts
capital from investors of these regions and the rest of the world to the GCC. Since governments
are majority shareholders and exercise control in most of the major companies, the overly risk-
averse investors are reassured that their investments are in good hands since governments are
less likely to go bankrupt. As a result, initial public offerings (IPOs) by companies are often
oversubscribed, reflecting investors’ drives for a share of previously wholly-owned companies by
nationals and newly-formed corporations. Since the GCC stock markets are fairly new, share
prices are initially offered at a bargain and returns are fairly substantial. Bley and Chen (2006)
report that, in 2004 alone, foreign portfolio holders collected between 150 and 170 billion US
dollars in profits from the GCC countries.
Along with the massive investment brought about by rising oil revenues, fiscal disciplines
coupled with low interest rates (on average between 3 and 4 percent in some cases) have also
helped the GCC in creating macroeconomic conditions amenable to an orderly dynamic busi-
ness environment. Translation costs and uncertainty about capital repatriation are minimal due
to these countries’ long ties with the US dollar as their anchor currency. Reforms to further
enhance benefits from technology transfer and massive capital inflows have been initiated in
terms of new laws to protect property rights, combat corruption, and to ease ownership restric-
tions and immigration. These measures contrast squarely with the external environment in the
Middle-East, Asia, and Africa where corruption, political upheaval, and poverty hinder eco-
nomic development. The misfortune of the region has offered to the GCC a pool of cheap labor
to capitalize on as they expand ambitious projects of infrastructure. The GCC’s commitment
to foster both vertical and horizontal capital inflows as an important engine of their economies
can be seen as a smart move as they are moving away from oil dependency to create industry
and service-based economies capable of rivaling other economies in the international markets.
The combined outcomes of this overall dynamic are that the GCC markets have become more
and more important over the years for investors seeking higher returns and workers seeking
better opportunities and for countries seeking investment projects.1
1It is expected that by 2020, GCC countries could rival rising economies such as Brazil, China, and India if
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There have been some previous attempts at documenting the determinants of capital inflows
to the Middle-East and North Africa. For example, in their study of international portfolio al-
location, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) find that risk diversification and the drive for higher
profits explain investors’ inclination for the region. Sadik and Bolbol (2001) provide evidence of
linkages between capital flows/foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology spillovers. They
have shown that contributions to technology and productivity can emanate from FDI as well
as other forms of capital formation. Mina’s (2007) examination of the location determinants
of FDI inflows to the GCC could not find that FDI is stimulated by the production, prices,
and proven reserves of oil. He instead found that relative oil utilization encourages FDI. These
contributions without a doubt have deepened our understanding of portfolio inflows to the re-
gion in general and to the GCC in particular. However, the picture is still incomplete when a
number of important factors such as investors’ preferences, regional and home biasness, labor
in-migration, and relative institutional quality are being overlooked or not being compared to
other successful regional blocs. In these respects, the present paper complements the existing
literature in several aspects. It is to our knowledge, a primer for the GCC if not the whole
Middle-East and North-Africa regions. We therefore argue that external environment, eco-
nomic fundamentals, countries’ specific characteristics, economic ties between source and host
countries, institutional quality of the host country relative to other potential host countries, the
level of real income of source countries and the financial openness of the host country all can
potentially explain international portfolio inflows to GCC countries. Most importantly, it is well
known that factors such as distance, financial innovations, capital mobility, and the number of
nationals from the source countries residing or working in the host country tend to strengthen
economic ties amongst nations. For example, an Indian investor would find it easier to invest
in, export and/or import to the GCC where Indians constitute the majority of the population
of workers in comparison to other non-GCC countries. Therefore, the interesting question that
we raise comes quite naturally: Can institutional quality, the number of expatriates, economic
linkages between hosts and source countries and/or socio-cultural affinities explain the patterns
of cross-border portfolio investments in the GCC region?
We investigate the patterns of portfolio allocation to GCC financial markets using panel
data analysis and compare the findings with those obtained for the OECD countries. Our
results show that, in line with earlier contributions to the literature, bilateral factors such as
trade volumes and the source country’s share of world market capitalization play a significant
their plan to enter a monetary union by 2010 and issue a common currency goes smoothly. Bley and Chen (2006),
Guetat and Serranito (2007), and Alkulaib et al. (2008) have already associated the strong economic growth of
the GCC countries to the ongoing economic and financial integration of the region with the rest of the world.
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role in portfolio allocation to the GCC region. There is also a strong portfolio “GCC bias”.
That is, a large share of the GCC investment comes from GCC members themselves. This bias
is similar in nature to the portfolio Euro bias also observed.2 It is the notable consequence
of not only the high level of financial and economic integration that characterizes the GCC
countries but also a reflection the ripple effect of post-September-11 reactions. We find that
institutional quality is statistically significant in all estimated models indicating that investors’
perception about the quality of institutions is an important factor in portfolio allocation. The
GCC receives a larger chunk of foreign portfolio investment because it has higher institutional
quality relative to other competing countries in the region. Additionally, we explore the effect
of labor in-migration to the GCC on capital inflows. We find that the greater the number of
expatriates originated from a given source country living in the GCC the higher the volume of
portfolio inflows from that country to the GCC. This can be explained by the unique structure
of the GCC members where more than 80% of their population are non-resident aliens. The
resulting effects are higher volume of goods and services traded (frequent trips back home),
higher volume of remittances transferred and lower transaction costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a multi-market
portfolio model relating international portfolio allocations with bilateral linkages. Section 3
describes the data set and the construction of some of the key variables of interest. Section 4
presents the empirical findings and analyzes the determinants of cross border asset holdings.
Section 5 presents the robustness check and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Bilateral Linkage Model
The underlying framework of this paper is the original Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) model where
trading costs play a crucial role in explaining empirical macroeconomic puzzles. This framework
has proven to be useful in addressing home bias puzzles in French and Poterba (1991). Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) have extended the Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model to N countries in
order to show that existing trading costs in the goods market and individual preferences affect
bilateral equity positions in both industrial and developing nations. The N-country model of
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2008) postulates that the home country’s share of equity that is held
by the foreign country is a decreasing function of the trading costs between the home and the
2See Baele et al. (2003), Lane and Milesi- Ferretti (2005). Also Balli et al. (2009) implemented similar work
for GCC region with a shorter period of time.
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foreign country and an increasing function of the real time importance of the good that is being
traded. We use the same framework to shed lights on the international portfolio inflows to GCC
countries.
Theoretically, there are N countries in the world and each country is endowed with a stock
of perishable goods that is random. Output is unevenly produced across countries and there
is a complete set of Arrow-Debreu (AD) securities in the capital markets. The model assumes
that individuals hold cross-border portfolio in only one period as they attempt to maximize
their expected utilities. We partition the N countries into two: h home country and j foreign
countries. The expected utility of the representative consumer in the home country is given by:
EUh = E{ 1
1− ρ([
j=N∑
j=1
$ijC
α−1
α
ij ]
α
α−1 )1−ρ = E
C1−ρh
1− ρ, (1)
where $ij is the relative preference by consumers in country j for good i, Ch is the index of
total real consumption, α is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods and ρ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
There are iceberg shipping costs η only a fraction of a unit of a good shipped from country
h to country j reaches to the destination. Accordingly, ηhj is greater than zerowhile assuming
there are no shipping costs for good i within the foreign country ηjj=0, or within home country,
ηhh=0. In addition, we normalize $jj =1.
Perfect competition in product markets requires that
Pih = (1− ηhj)Pij , (2)
where Pih and Pij denotes the price of good i in countries h and j respectively. In the model,
we have free traded Arrow-Debreu securities where the marginal utility per dollar for good i
across countries must be the same for the last units consumed. Put differently, the ratio of
marginal utility derived from the consumption of good i must be equal to the relative price of
good i across the two countries.
In other words,
1
Pih
∂U
∂Cih
=
1
Pij
∂U
∂Cij
(3)
C
−1/α
ih C
1/α−ρ
h = (1− ηhj)$hjC−1/αhj C1/α−ρj (4)
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under the simplifying assumption where 1/α=ρ
Cij = (1− ηhj)α$αijCih. (5)
The goods market equilibrium is
Yi = Cih +
Pij
Pih
∗ Cij . (6)
If we generalize the output clearing condition to N markets,
Yi =
j=N∑
j=1
Cij
(1− ηij) . (7)
In line with AD securities, the ratio of home to foreign consumption of goods must be equal
to net asset inflows to the home country from the foreign country.
θhj =
Phj ∗ Chj∑N
j=1 Phj ∗ Chj
(8)
After appropriate substitution of equations 5 and 7 into equation 8, we get;
θhj =
(1− ηhj)α−1$αij∑j=N
j=1 [(1− ηhj)α−1$αij ]
Yh. (9)
Under the simplifying assumption that 1/α=ρ , this allocation can be achieved by foreign asset
trading. The allocation means that country j holds a larger share in country h’s equity, the
lower is the transportation cost between countries h and j relative to the average transport cost
between country h and all other countries; and the greater is the relevant importance attached
to good i in country j ’s consumption preferences.
By taking the logarithm of Equation (9), we obtain
log(θhj) = (α− 1)log(1− ηhj) + αlog($hj)− log(
j=N∑
j=1
[(1− ηhj)α−1$αhj ] + logYh. (10)
The very last two terms are fixed terms for both home and foreign country. Therefore we can
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represent those terms as constant terms. This allows us to further simplify the expression to3
log(θhj) = Ah + (α− 1)∗log(1− ηhj) + α∗log($hj). (12)
This reduced form will help us to test the model empirically. In the reduced form, directly,
transportation costs and consumer preferences are not observable, but may be captured by a
host of proxy variables. The linear model can be set up as follows;
log(1− ηhj) = λχτhj + υτhj , (13)
and
log($hj) = λχ
$
hj + υ
$
hj . (14)
Obviously, the vectors could be overlapping sets in that the parameters may not be individually
identifiable. In the end, we obtain a reduced form equation or model, with the vectors χhj
embedding the proxy estimates for bilateral factors, such as distance between the source and
host country, trade competition in third markets, cultural linkages, lending from foreign to home
country and bilateral trade volumes between home and foreign country.4
3 Data
We use a broad sample of countries to capture the patterns of international portfolio inflows to
GCC markets. We classify GCC as host countries to 35 countries, which are listed in the Table 1,
as source countries. The data set for this paper originates from various sources as detailed in
Table 2. We obtain a pair-wise volume of cross border portfolio holdings in US dollars from the
International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS) for the period
2001 to 2006. These are reliable surveys that use consistent guidelines in measuring holdings
of equity and bonds across countries. We could not use the survey data collected for the years
1994 and 1997 due to the unavailability of data for the GCC countries, which by and large have
fairly new financial markets and have recently opened the non-oil sector of their economies to
the rest of the world.
3When we changed the order of the countries, the equation will be as follows;
log(θj∗h) = (α− 1)log(1− ηj∗h) + αlog($j∗h)− log(
j∗=N,j 6=j∗∑
j=1
[(1− ηjh)α−1$αj∗i]) + logYj∗ . (11)
the very last two terms will be the fixed effect of the foreign country pair. In the empirical model, the constant
effects for both host(home) and source(foreign) country have been used accordingly.
4We use bilateral factors which are available for the GCC markets.
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We construct two variants of portfolio holdings from the data set by looking at portfolio
flows from source to host country. The first variable is the total foreign portfolio, which is the
sum of debt and equity securities while the second one is just composed of pure debt securities.
We discarded a third variable that could have purely embraced financial assets originating from
equity securities transactions because the volume as well as the allocations of equities to GCC
markets are very limited and most of the times biased towards certain markets. The CPIS
dataset also reveals that the majority of foreign portfolio holdings from the GCC markets are
debt securities. This perceptible feature of the data supports our approach in focusing on both
total portfolio inflows and total debt securities, not on equities alone as a dependent variable.
Following Sørensen et al. (2007), we construct a variable on total market capitalization
by taking the weighted average of bond and equity markets capitalization for each country.
We measure the size of a country’s total bond market capitalization as outstanding domestic
debt securities minus outstanding short term domestic securities plus outstanding international
bonds and notes.5 We create the variable on total market capitalization of equity markets by
taking the weighted average of the bond market and the equity market capitalization of each
country. Intuitively, we expect that the higher market capitalization of source country, higher
portfolio holdings from GCC region is expected.
Measuring capital control has always been a dilemma for researchers since it is difficult to
distinguish between pure capital inflows and capital inflows that originate from the relaxation
of rules and policies. We follow Chinn and Hiro (2007) in constructing a variable that mea-
sures the level of financial openness of GCC markets. Chinn and Hiro (2007) broadly define
capital openness, as a set of dummy variables while taking into consideration the set of restric-
tions on cross border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These include variables indicating:
• the presence of multiple exchange rates(k1)
• restrictions on current account transactions(k2)
• restrictions on capital account transactions (k3);
• the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4).
Among the binary variables on capital openness, the one related to restrictions on capital ac-
count transactions is key in the determination of international portfolio allocation. Accordingly,
we trace this variable, (k3), over time and take its average over a five-year period to build our
5Short-term securities are defined as securities with maturity of less than a year.
9
own dummy variable. Our objective is to be able to observe the effects of the changes in cap-
ital restrictions in a broader scope. Analogous to Mody and Murshid (2005) and Chinn and
Hiro (2007), we create the binary variable on capital restriction by considering financial open-
ness rather than the existence of capital restrictions or not. Our dummy variable takes the
value of 1 when the country does not have capital control restrictions and 0 otherwise.
The capital control variable is constructed as follows:
CAPITALCONTROL =
k3,t + k3,t−1 + k3,t−2 + k3,t−3 + k3,t−4
5
, (15)
where k3,t−n is the dummy variable for the capital restriction decision by IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) n years ago.In the empirical
analysis, we expect that countries having less capital restrictions will be exposed higher foreign
liabilities.
3.1 Institutional Quality and Freedom Indices
Institutional quality is measured using the corruption perception index of Transparency Inter-
national. This index has been used in a number of previous studies, and a review of both the
index.6 The index measures institutional quality in five major areas: (1) size of government,
(2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) exchange
with foreigners, and (5) regulation of capital, labor, and businesses. Alternatively, collected
since the 1970s by the Freedom House, the Freedom House index measure of political rights
and civil liberties is a group of indices that assess countries on the basis of a wide range of
criteria including political rights, civil rights, freedom of expression of beliefs, rule of law, and
functioning of government. We use two of such indices: the functioning of government and the
civil rights to gauge the quality of institutions of the source country relative to the host country
when allocating their portfolio. Portfolio holders are able to use the institutional quality as a
proxy for the default risk measurement of both source and host country. Therefore, relatively
lower institutional quality in the source country compared to the host country, higher portfolio
allocation in host country is expected.
Other variables used in the panel estimation include: total debt to GDP ratio, bilateral
linkage variables (distance, trade volume between hosts and source countries, and the number
of expatriates originated from source country to host country, binary variables like having
common language and common colonial past, and having same). 7 Debt to GDP ratio, just
6To cite just a few; Husted (1999) Habib and Zurawicki (2002) Svensson(2005), Seligson (2007).
7The sources and explanations about these variables are incorporated in Table 1.
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like institutional quality, is used to be a proxy for the measurement of default risk. We used
debt to GDP ratio to account for the importance of solvency in capital markets. Relatively
higher debt to GDP ratio does the source country have, portfolio investors of that country seek
for other markets to decrease the default risk. Therefore we expect to have higher portfolio
holdings when the relative debt to GDP ratio increases. PPP adjusted GDP is used to proxy
the wealth and income level of the source country. Naturally, as the income level of the source
country increases, the residents want to allocate the extra wealth to different markets and there
will be more portfolio investments to the host countries. The bilateral linkage variables indicate
the stronger linkages between the source and host country. Having stronger linkages help to
create comparative advantage in transferring financial securities(lower transaction costs, faster
transfer, etc), therefore we expect positive effect (except distance) in the empirical analysis.
Last, religion dummy will be a proxy to measure the cultural similarities, in particular for those
muslim investors seek for the markets that will have non-interest bearing assets, we expect to
have higher portfolio holdings when the source country’s population is dominated by muslim
residents.
4 Empirical Model
In this section, we estimate the reduced form equation of Lane and Milesi-Feretti’s (2008) N-
country portfolio model to uncover the main determinants of international financial asset inflows
to the GCC markets. The regression equation is given by;
θhjt = α
h
t + α
j
t + β
∗
0,tDEBT
j−h
t + β
∗
1,tGCCt + β
∗
2,tZt + β
∗
3,tXt + t , (16)
where the dependent variable, θhj , is the log volume of source country (j )’s foreign portfolio
allocated in host country (h); αh and αj are the corresponding fixed effect variables of host and
source country respectively(double fixed effects).8 Market capitalization rate and Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted real GDP per capita are used to gauge the source country fixed
effect, financial openness is employed for the host country fixed effect. DEBTj−h is the debt
to GDP ratio differential between source and host country. To account for the importance of
solvency in capital markets, we consider the effect of fiscal indebtedness of debtor countries on
the bonds market. We use the external debt differentials in a way that enables us to test the
significance of both fixed effects. Furthermore, we create a number of variables, namely, GCC
8We included the fixed effects in accordance with the Hausman test. It is a test of testing if the random effects
are consistent and efficient. (H0: that random effects is consistent and efficient, versus H1: that random effects
would be inconsistent.) We found that Chi-square value is large enough to(55.13) to reject the null hypothesis.
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and Zt to test for bilateral linkages between source and host countries. GCC is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the source country is a member of the GCC block and 0 otherwise. Zt
is a set of cultural, demographic, and institutional variables that regroup institutional quality,
expatriates, and religion. Religion takes the value of 1 if the dominant religion in the source
country is Islam and 0 otherwise whereas institutional quality is an index whose scale varies from
0 to 10, with 10 being the highest quality. Since this variable is in relative terms, we therefore
anticipate an inverse relationship between source countries’ institutional quality relative to the
GCC and capital inflows to the GCC. Put differently, the lower the quality of institutions
in a source country relative to the GCC, the higher the capital inflows to the GCC. Similar
reasoning applies to the Freedom variable, which is an index that varies from 1 to 7, with 1
representing complete freedom and 7 the absence of the same. We employed the freedom index as
a robustness check variable to check if our model has been affected from different institutional
quality measures. Expatriate is a variable that captures number of citizens from the source
countries earning a living in the GCC. Lastly, Xt contains bilateral factors such as export
volume from source country to host countries in U.S Dollars, distance in kilometers between the
capital city of the source country and the host country, and binary variables including; having
common language and common colonial past. All but the discrete and index variables are in
logarithmic forms.
5 Empirical Results
In the empirical analysis, we employ multivariate panel data regression techniques to uncover
the determinants of portfolio inflows to GCC and also compare our findings with the OECD
countries for the period 2001–2006.9 Panel and instrumental variable (IV) estimators are used
to arrive at the coefficient estimates and the main results are presented in Tables 3 to 5. We test
the robustness of our findings with regard to the choice of estimators and run a separate set of
regression using Censored Normal Tobit. The results are inserted in Table 6. Unless otherwise
specified, our analysis is based on a significance level of 5 %. Nonetheless, we indicate all the
significance levels on the Tables. Only the explanatory variables for which there are variations
over the sample are incorporated in the regressions. Tables 3 to 5 contain each three columns of
estimates of the reduced form model of Equation 16. Column 1 showcases the results related to
variables commonly used in the literature to gauge the determinants of capital inflows. Column
2 presents, in addition to the usual variables, coefficient estimates of the cultural, demographic,
9The volume of foreign asset inflows as well as the number of investors with stakes in GCC markets are quite
limited in 2001, however, both the number and the volume have increased gradually in the years after.
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and institutional variables that we conjecture explain the volume of foreign assets holdings in
the GCC. A comparison of these first two columns clearly delineates our contribution to the
existing literature. Additionally, considering the dependency of the level of imports of the host
country from the source country, we used the instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity
problem Column 3 repeats the same exercise using the Instrument variable(IV) estimator. We
treat as potentially endogenous variables for the level of imports. Our instrument list consists
of; distance, a contiguous dummy, the lagged the level of imports, common language dummy,
similar country dummy. 10
The first column in Table 3 shows that coefficient estimates for variables such as the import
volume, foreign market capitalization, capital control, and GCC are positive and statistically
significant in explaining the volume of portfolio inflows to GCC markets. These findings confirm
that goods and services and capital markets integration are important in attracting investments
across countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) have reported a similarly strong positive
relationship between the bilateral trade volume and portfolio inflows using the 2001 survey data
of the CPIS. We also find the differential of debt to GDP ratio is significant at the 10 percent
level whereas distance between source and host country, and cultural affinities represented by
common language and colonial past are statistically insignificant, though they have the correct
signs. Two surprising results, however, have emerged: the PPP-adjusted income per capita of
the source country and distance are found to be statistically insignificant. Contrary to what
we find, one would expect as income grows, individuals tend to have more money allocated
for investment and the GCC would have benefited from these portfolio diversifications. Also,
the farther away a source country is to a host country, the less integrated their markets are as
transaction and transportation costs discourage trade and investment, unless the host country
is a shelter for hiding capitals. Despite these unexpected results, most of the findings are well
justified within the context of GCC as we have explained earlier.
The importance of factor market capitalization is well understood in that the GCC is the
most attractive place for investment in the Middle-East and the greater African continent when
investors factor in market returns, the relative easiness of capital investing and repatriation of
earnings, and the stability of the individual currencies that reduces translation costs. Therefore,
investors’ decisions whether to reallocate existing assets or to acquire new assets as their wealth
expands will likely consider the GCC over other nations for similar risks. It is not by pure
coincidence that the financial openness variable (capital control) is statistically significant. As
10Contiguous dummy(takes 1 if the both source and host country share borders, 0 elsewhere,) and similar
country dummy(takes 1 if the countries are politically and culturally similar) The details of the new instruments
are also listed in Table 1.
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it is well understood in the literature, the lesser the barriers for capital account transactions, the
greater the capital inflows. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2004) have indeed shown
that emerging markets with lesser financial market restrictions often attract more capital and
thereby experience higher economic growth. This is evident even amongst the GCC countries;
the Sultanate of Oman has implemented stiffer capital market regulations relative to other GCC
members and as a result the volume of capital inflows to Oman is the lowest.
Although capital asset pricing model (CAPM) postulates a direct relationship between risk
and expected return, investors do diversify their portfolio in search for both higher returns
and lower risk. In fact, Grubel (1968) finds risk minimization to be the underlying motive for
investors who opt for internationally diversified portfolios. Subsequent studies by Chow and
Denning (1992) and Lewis (1996 and 1999) have confirmed Grubel’s finding both theoretically
and empirically. Default risk, however, remains the most serious threat of all since it represents a
complete loss of investment and is sometimes unforeseeable due to information asymmetry. Our
measure of portfolio holdings in Table 3 contains both debt and equity, with debt representing a
substantial portion of the total assets. The debt to GDP ratio is one of such leading indicators
that can signal to the typical risk-averse investor the ability of a nation to repay its debt. We
take this into consideration by incorporating the differential debt to GDP ratio across countries
in the regression equation to determine whether the ability of the GCC to meet its financial
obligations at the time of maturity in relative terms can be a magnet for capital inflows to
the region. The statistical significance of the differential debt to GDP ratio at the margin (10
percent level) is indicative that investors do not seem to care much about the relative degree of
solvency of the GCC with respect to other countries in the panel. Much sense can be made of
this finding when one peruses Table 1 of the list of countries considered as investors to the GCC.
The bulk of these countries are high income OECD and non-OECD countries. Issues concerning
solvency may be limited to countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, and the Philippines.
The second column of Table 3 presents the results for total portfolio holdings with the three
new additional variables included. As can gleaned, these results represent quite an improvement
over those of column 1 and at the very least suggest that omissions of cultural and institutional
variables lead to mis-specification bias. All three variables introduced –institutional quality, ex-
patriates (at the 10 percent level), and religion–are statistically significant in explaining portfolio
inflows. We also find that distance becomes significant at the 10 percent level while differential
debt to GDP ratio is insignificant. These results are at par with the reality of the GCC. As the
quality of institution in the source country relative to the GCC members decreases, investors
would be more motivated to allocate their investments to GCC countries. Indeed, the quality
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of institution is a valid proxy for measuring the relative possibility of default risk of the coun-
tries. When we consider capital mobility that arises due investment reallocation, investors do
have a tendency to switch from high risk home markets to lower risk foreign markets, which
is observed for GCC markets. The significance of religion also makes sense; as we have noted,
there exists a GCC bias when it comes to portfolio allocation. The results therefore suggest that
when both source and host country’s populations are dominated by Islamic beliefs, investors
do care about religion whether they are investing at home or overseas. With the millions of
Muslims worldwide and the growth of Islamic financial products in the international markets,
it is not surprising that portfolio allocation is likely to be biased towards Islamic products as
investments to securities may be governed by strict rules since the Qu’ran forbid Muslims from
earning income through interest-based activities.
Lastly, our finding that the level of expatriates is a relevant explanatory variable in explaining
portfolio inflows to the GCC is justified by the intrinsic dynamic and characteristics of the GCC
labor markets in that over 80 percent of the population are foreigners. As can be understood,
expatriates foment stronger financial connections between source and host countries since a
portion of their hard earned income has to be sent back home to maintain direct and extended
families or to invest for retirements. This bond between source and host countries creates an
interesting quid-pro-quo relationship. Source countries invest in the GCC partly because a large
portion of their citizens reside there and as such a market segment for their products is already
in place. The GCC reciprocates with investment in the source countries in search for higher
profits.
The last column of Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the total portfolio
holdings of Equation 16 using the IV method. Only the variables that are significant in column
2 are incorporated in the regression equations. Since the IV estimation indicates that the import
volume of host country from source country is to be considered as endogenous, we use the import
variable as an instrument and rerun the model. All the variables continue to be significant but
with larger coefficient estimates, confirming that cultural and institutional variables amongst
others matter in explaining portfolio inflows to GCC.
For comparison purposes, we run a similar set of of panel data regressions using source and
host countries from the OECD members and present the results for the determinants of foreign
bond holdings in Table 4. We observe that in columns 1 and 2 the regular explanatory variables
continue to be useful in explaining the bilateral portfolio holdings, which confirm Lane and
Milesi-Feretti’s (2008) findings. Amongst the new variables introduced, relative institutional
quality was the only variable found to be statistically significant for the OECD countries. The
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results show that the volume of expatriates does not play a significant role in explaining bilateral
portfolio holdings across OECD members. This could be understood by the difference in labor
dynamics between OECD countries and the GCC countries. The last column of Table 4 contains
the IV estimation results. It can be observed that the results are almost similar to the OLS
estimations. We also note the existence of a bond Euro bias as the coefficient estimates of EMU
is statistically significant at the 1 % level in all regressions, indicating that European investors
exhibit a strong preference towards their own markets at the time of diversifying their portfolio.
Since a large portion of total portfolio inflows to the GCC consists of debts, we also inves-
tigate the determinants of pure bond holdings and present the results in Table 5. On average
these results are similar to those reported in Table 3, with one exception: the PPP adjusted
real income per capita of source country is now statistically significant using both OLS and IV
methods regardless of whether the cultural and institutional variables are incorporated in the
equation or not. Other notable results are that institutional quality, the volume of expatriates,
and religion play a significant role in explaining portfolio inflows to GCC. We further observe
that our dummy variable, GCC, is positive and significant, indicating that there is a“GCC bias”
in the debt inflows as well. This is an important finding that appears to suggest that in GCC
and European regions where economic integration has reached or is near its highest stage—
monetary union—, investors prefer to allocate their portfolio mostly within their respective
regions. Although this pattern may further enhance relationships among member countries, it
carries the drawback of limiting income smoothing via portfolio diversification. In fact, this is a
more serious issue for GCC countries where output diversification is quite limited. With 50 %
or less of their total output coming from the non-oil sector, GCC investors bear higher risks due
to the impediment of further diversifying their portfolio across industries within member coun-
tries. We therefore conjecture that for the debt inflows to the host countries, GCC investors’
priority is to allocate their wealth to Sharia’a-compliant debt instruments from Islamic markets.
This also partly explains the GCC bias observed because investors adhere to religious norms.11
When we compare these results with Table 4 we note a similar bias, namely, a bond“Euro” bias
in the regression of total debt securities.12
11Due to data restrictions, we have only Bahrain and Kuwait listed as both source and host countries. Although
the other GCC member countries do possess external assets, e.g., the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA), Qatar Investment Authority have external assets around 875 billion USD, the geographic distribution
of those assets has not been published.
12The regional bias contends that investors tend to hold a large share of their assets portfolio within their
geographical boundaries even when they have the opportunities to spread their investments equally in various
markets. These patterns are consistently observed lately, despite the overall increase in the volume of international
assets holdings that takes place due to financial market integration and economic booms that have occurred in
other parts of the world. Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2005) Lane (2006) and Maela (2008) have also found portfolio
Euro bias bias in their studies.
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5.1 Robustness Checks
In order to ascertain whether the determinants of portfolio inflows to GCC uncovered in Tables 3
and 5 are not sensitive to the estimation method used, we conduct a robustness check using the
Tobit model. This estimation technique was chosen due the special feature of the CPIS data,
which contains a large number of observations for portfolio inflows from other countries to the
GCC markets that have a value of zero. This implies that a significant portion of portfolio inflows
to the GCC markets from our source countries sample is negligible. Additionally, we test for the
institutional quality with a different measure, the relative freedom index of source countries (0 is
minimum: not free and 15 is maximum: perfectly free). The results are documented in Table 6
confirming the GCC bias 13 the importance of institutional quality, the volume of expatriates,
and religion among other variables in explaining portfolio inflows to the GCC. Therefore our
findings are robust, eclectic, and insightful.
6 Concluding Remarks
Over the last few decades, the GCC countries have capitalized on oil revenue growth to imple-
ment macroeconomic structural reforms capable of enhancing their profile in the global market.
With the changes in ownership and immigration laws, stable currencies, and the billions of dol-
lars poured into infrastructure projects, tourism, real estate, and petrochemical, the GCC has
sent a strong message to investors that economic opportunities loom in the region and by part-
nering with the government their investments are relatively safer for similar returns elsewhere.
What we have observed thus far from reading the literature is that massive capital inflows to
the GCC are due to growth in oil prices and the highly inelastic demand for oil at the world
level. However, a full accounting of the underlying determinants of portfolio inflows to the GCC
countries is still missing. This paper has added to the literature in producing a comprehensive
analysis of the patterns of cross-border portfolio investments in the region. Building on the
footprints of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)’s two-country model and the extension of their work
by Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2008) to n-country model, we use panel data analysis along with
the CPIS data of the IMF and data from other reliable sources to uncover the determinants
of portfolio inflows to the GCC countries. We extend our analysis to the OECD members in
search of a benchmark for comparing the results obtained for the GCC. For each measure of
portfolio inflows, whether it is pure bond or total portfolio holdings (bonds and equity), we
13The GCC bias is again present, providing convincing evidence that when GCC investors make the decision
to diversify their portfolio, they–at least the two members, Bahrain and Kuwait, —primarily choose other GCC
countries to allocate their wealth.
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conduct a battery of checks using different estimation techniques (IV and Tobit) to assess the
robustness of our findings.
The empirical results show that international portfolio inflows to GCC markets are primarily
explained by a GCC bias similar to the European bias of Lane-Milesi and Feretti (2008)(a sizable
portion of the capital inflows to the GCC countries comes from the GCC members themselves),
cultural affinities and institutional quality. We also find that portfolio investments to the GCC
are explained by bilateral linkages; mainly, the volume of import of host countries from the
source countries, strong fiscal position of the GCC markets, world market capitalization, capital
market liberalization, and income levels of the source countries. These results hold irrespective
of the estimation method used to document the patterns of portfolio holdings. This paper
offers a valuable insight into the modeling of cross-border portfolio inflows to the GCC region.
It shows that institutional quality, the volume of expatriates living in the GCC, and religion
are all relevant variables that statistically and significantly explain capital inflows to the GCC.
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Table 1: Data Description and Construction of the Variables
Variable Source and Explanations
Foreign Portfolio Inflows IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for years
between 2001 and 2005. In the regressions, we employ the log
linearized U.S. Dollar value of the financial
asset inflows to GCC markets. Survey data exists for 1997 year as
well. However for 1997, the survey was not conducted extensively.
Import Import of the GCC countries from the source countries listed below.
The data source is taken from IMF’s Direction of Trade Database
for years 2001–2005. We employed the log linearized values of the
imports.
Distance French Research Center in International Economics
(CEPII ,http://www.cepii.fr)
Debt Market Capitalization Domestic Debt securities and outstanding short term securities are
obtained from Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Quarterly
Review. We created size of a country’s total bond market
capitalization as outstanding domestic market securities minus
outstanding short term domestic securities plus outstanding
international bonds and notes.
Equity Market Capitalization This data set is obtained from World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Gross Domestic Product (PPP adjusted.) United Nation’s National Accounts Database and
authors’ own calculations.
CPI Index United Nation’s National Accounts Database.
Population (In person) United Nation’s National Accounts Database.
We employed the log linearized of population in person.
Debt Position International Financial Statistics Database and European Commission
Database.
Capital Controls IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions(AREAER). We created the capital control variable using
restrictions on capital account transactions. We created the capital
control variable by taking the average of these binary variables for
5 year period. Details are explained in the text.
Expatriates OECD’s International Migration Statistics and World Bank’s migration
Database.
Corruption and Perception Index www.Tranparancy.org
Common Colony CIA Factbook
Common Language CIA Factbook
Contiguous Dummy French Research Center in International Economics
(CEPII ,http://www.cepii.fr)
Similar Country Dummy French Research Center in International Economics
(CEPII ,http://www.cepii.fr)
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Table 2: Countries in the Data Sets
Source Countries
Austria Japan Thailand
Bahamas Korea Turkey
Bahrain Kuwait United Kingdom
Belgium Macao SAR of China
Bermuda Malaysia Host Countries
Canada Malta Bahrain
Cyprus Mauritus Kuwait
Denmark Netherlands Oman
Egypt Norway Qatar
France Pakistan Saudi Arabia
Germany Philippines United Arab Emirates
Guinea-Bissau South Africa
Hong Kong SAR of China Spain
Ireland Sweden
Italy Switzerland
Notes: Time period is 2001-2006
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Table 3: The Determinants of Foreign Portfolio Holdings
Panel Panel IV
IMPORTh 0.12∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(2.16) (2.29) (3.17)
DISTANCE −0.81 −0.61∗∗
(−1.33) (−1.88)
FMCj 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(3.66) (3.48) (2.72)
CAPITALCONTROLh 0.19∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(2.12) (2.16) (2.59)
GDPj 0.18 0.08 0.29∗
(1.42) (0.55) (1.91)
COMMON LANGUAGE 1.66 –1.36
(0.98) (–0.77)
COMMON COLONY 0.22 0.65
(1.22) (0.98)
DEBTj−h 0.45∗ 0.44 0.66∗∗∗
(1.68) (1.19) (3.10)
GCC 2.47∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗
(7.01) (5.02) (5.67)
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITYj –3.60∗∗ –3.18∗∗∗
(–2.29) (–2.92)
EXPATRIATESj 1.19∗ 1.41∗
(1.88) (1.69)
RELIGION 1.58∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(3.65) (3.54)
Notes:Pooled panel regressions for determinants of reign Portfolio Holdings. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in paren-
thesis. Dataset is employed annual for years 2001-2006. The dependent variable is log linearized volume of source country’s (j) portfolio
holding in the host country, (h). Similarly, IMPORTh is the log linearized import volume of host country shipped from source country. FMCj
is defined as the source country’s share of world market capitalization. DEBTj is the debt to GDP ratio differential between source and
host country. DISTANCE is the financial center distance between host and source countries in kilometers, this variable is also log linearized.
GCC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if source country is a member of GCC, zero elsewhere. GDPj is the log linearized PPP adjusted GDP
per capita of source country. CAPITALCONTROLh is the capital control adjustments of host country. Details of the variable is explained
in the text. RELIGION refers a dummy variable equal to 1 when the recognized religion of the the source country is Islam, 0 elsewhere.
COMMON LANGUAGE is binary variable takes one when both source and host country have same language. COMMON COLONY is a binary
variable takes one when both source and host country had a colonial relationship in the past. INSTITUTIONAL QUALITYj is an index created
to measure the relative quality of the institution of source countries. EXPATRIATESj is the level of the expatriates living in the host country,
originated from the source country.∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the relevant coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: The Determinants of Foreign Bond Holdings
Host: OECD Host:OECD Host:OECD
Source: OECD Source: OECD Source: OECD
Panel Panel IV
FMCj 0.52∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(4.28) (4.11) (3.11)
DEBTj−h 0.28∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(2.01) (1.99) (2.13)
EMU 1.82∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗
(5.66) (6.32) (3.13)
CAPITALCONTROLh 0.25∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(3.04) (3.12) (3.02)
DISTANCE −0.64 −0.14∗
(−0.29) (−1.79)
IMPORTh 0.58∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.65∗∗
(3.18) (3.77) (4.01)
GDPj 0.25∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(2.12) (2.19) (2.25)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.45 0.16
(1.06) (1.32)
COMMON COLONY 0.19∗ 0.44
(1.67) (1.17)
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITYj –0.57∗ –0.23∗∗
(–1.81) (–2.02)
EXPATRIATESj –0.18 0.11
(–0.12) (0.16)
Panel regressions are done for country by country total portfolio holdings. Host refers to the classification of the domestic country. Source
refers to the classification of the country issuing the foreign asset. For example, when we have “Host: OECD, Source: OECD” this limits
the sample to country pairs in which the host country is an OECD member while the source country is taken from the sample of OECD.
OECD includes Australia,Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Korea
Republic, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. non-EMU: Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Iceland, Japan, Korea Republic, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given
in parenthesis. Dataset is employed annual for years 2001-2006. The dependent variable is log linearized volume of source country’s (j)
portfolio holding in the host country, (h). Similarly, IMPORTh is the log linearized import volume of host country shipped from source
country. FMCj is defined as the source country’s share of world market capitalization. DEBTj is the debt to GDP ratio differential between
source and host country. DISTANCE is the financial center distance between host and source countries in kilometers, this variable is also log
linearized. GDPj is the log linearized PPP adjusted GDP per capita of source country. CAPITALCONTROLh is the capital control adjustments
of host country. Details of the variable is explained in the text. RELIGION refers a dummy variable equal to 1 when the recognized religion
of the the source country is Islam, 0 elsewhere. COMMON LANGUAGE is binary variable takes one when both source and host country have
same language. COMMON COLONY is a binary variable takes one when both source and host country had a colonial relationship in the past.
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
j is an index created to measure the relative quality of the institution of source countries. EXPATRIATESj is the
level of the expatriates living in the host country, originated from the source country. EMU is a dummy variable equal to 1 if host country is
a member of EMU, zero elsewhere.∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the relevant coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: The Determinants of Foreign Investment Inflows: Debt Holdings
Panel Panel IV
IMPORTh 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(2.24) (2.23) (2.66)
DISTANCE −0.77 −0.71
(−1.58) (−1.59)
FMCj 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(2.34) (2.44) (2.65)
CAPITALCONTROLh 0.45∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(3.19) (3.03) (2.55)
GDPj 1.62∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗
(2.55) (2.84) (2.54)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.78 0.59∗
(1.56) (1.69)
COMMON COLONY 0.31 0.32
(0.67) (0.22)
DEBTj−h 0.33∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(2.15) (2.71) (3.02)
GCC 3.45∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗
(6.74) (3.24) (6.02)
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITYj –2.44∗ –2.49∗
(–1.90) (–1.93)
EXPATRIATESj 0.88∗∗ 0.91∗∗
(2.15) (2.20)
RELIGION 1.68∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗
(3.44) (2.89)
Notes:Pooled panel regressions for determinants of reign Portfolio Holdings. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in paren-
thesis. Dataset is employed annual for years 2001-2006. The dependent variable is log linearized volume of source country’s (j) portfolio
holding in the host country, (h). Similarly, IMPORTh is the log linearized import volume of host country shipped from source country. FMCj
is defined as the source country’s share of world market capitalization. DEBTj is the debt to GDP ratio differential between source and
host country. DISTANCE is the financial center distance between host and source countries in kilometers, this variable is also log linearized.
GCC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if source country is a member of GCC, zero elsewhere. GDPj is the log linearized PPP adjusted GDP
per capita of source country. CAPITALCONTROLh is the capital control adjustments of host country. Details of the variable is explained
in the text. RELIGION refers a dummy variable equal to 1 when the recognized religion of the the source country is Islam, 0 elsewhere.
COMMON LANGUAGE is binary variable takes one when both source and host country have same language. COMMON COLONY is a binary
variable takes one when both source and host country had a colonial relationship in the past. INSTITUTIONAL QUALITYj is an index created
to measure the relative quality of the institution of source countries. EXPATRIATESj is the level of the expatriates living in the host country,
originated from the source country.∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the relevant coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: The Determinants of Foreign Investment Inflow: Total Portfolio Holdings
Tobit Estimation
Tobit
IMPORTh 0.18∗∗
(2.88)
FMCj 0.41∗∗
(2.03)
DISTANCE −0.18∗
(−1.77)
DEBTj−h 0.31
(1.61)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.11∗
(1.67)
COMMON COLONY 0.30
(1.60)
CAPITALCONTROLh 0.46∗∗
(2.47)
GCC 2.70∗∗∗
(4.40)
GDPj 1.87∗∗
(2.23)
FREEDOM INDEXj –2.61∗∗∗
(–3.05)
EXPATRIATESj 1.41∗∗
(2.61)
RELIGION 1.95∗∗
(4.53)
Estimation Method:Cencored Normal TOBIT. Sub-Samples used in the regression are explained in the text. Dataset is employed annual for
years 2001-2006. The dependent variable is log linearized volume of source country’s (j) portfolio holding in the host country, (h). Similarly,
IMPORT
h is the log linearized import volume of host country shipped from source country. FMCj is defined as the source country’s share of
world market capitalization. DEBTj is the debt to GDP ratio differential between source and host country. DISTANCE is the financial center
distance between host and source countries in kilometers, this variable is also log linearized. GCC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if source
country is a member of GCC, zero elsewhere. GDPj is the log linearized PPP adjusted GDP per capita of source country. CAPITALCONTROLh
is the capital control adjustments of host country. Details of the variable is explained in the text. RELIGION refers a dummy variable equal to
1 when the recognized religion of the the source country is Islam, 0 elsewhere. COMMON LANGUAGE is binary variable takes one when both
source and host country have same language. COMMON COLONY is a binary variable takes one when both source and host country had a
colonial relationship in the past. FREEDOM INDEXj is an index created to measure the relative quality of the institution of source countries.
EXPATRIATES
j is the level of the expatriates living in the host country, originated from the source country.∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the
relevant coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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